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NEUTRALITY IN MODERN ARMED CONFLICTS:
A SURVEY OF THE DEVELOPING LA'V':'
by Lieutenant Colonel Walter L. Williams, Jr. **

Neutrality may raise as many legal problems for states
embracing it, as belligerency does .fo1· states at zmr. In
this article the auth01·, a professo1' of /au• at the College of
William and Mary, discusses some of these p1·oblems. In
particular, he considers wlzethe1· states lzaz·e au unlimited
right to be neutral tou.:m·d belligaents under the United
Nations Charter.
Traditionally, neutmlity u·as a matte1· of free choice
for states, subject to any treaty obligations. There u•as no
obligation in genaal to 1·emain neutml or to become a
belligerent in the face of zcarlike actions of other states.
In modern times, some scholars haz•e suggested that the
United Nations Chm·ter and laze dez•eloped thereuncle1·
*The opinions and conclusions expressed in this article are those of the author and
do not necessarily represent the views of The Judge Advocate General's School, the
Department of the Army, or any other governmental agency.
This article has previously been published in substantially similar form under the
title, The Et•olution of the Notion of Neutrality in .\locierll .-\rmcci Collt1u:tsAdditional Report, at 18 Revue de Droit Penal Militaire et de Droit de Ia Guerre
159-90 (1978). Professor Williams' article was one of se,·eral in various languages
published by the Ret·ue as part of a symposium on neutrality in armed conflict.
The Raue, first published in 1962, is a publication of the International Society of
Military Law and the Law of War, with offices at the Palais de Justice, Brussels,
Belgiu~. The mailing address for both the Ret'IH' and the Society is: A.S.B.L.
Seminaire de Droit penal militaire, Palais de Justice, 1000 Bruxelles, Belgium.
For several years the United States correspondent for the Society was Lieutenant
Colonel James A. Burger, deputy staff judge advocate for the 8th Infantry Division,
Bad Kreuznach, Germany, 1980 to present. He was assigned to the faculty of The
Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia, from 1975 to 1979.
~~ JAGC, U.S. Army Reserve. l\lobilizatiun designee to Tlw Judge Ad\'vcate G~:n
eral's School, Charlottesville, Virginia. Professor of Law, l\larshall-\\'ythl! School
of Law. College of William and l\lary. Williamsburg, Virginia, 1977 to present.
Associated with l\Iarshall-Wythe School of Law sincl' 1972. On acth·~: tluty in tn~:
F.S. Army Judge Ach·ocate General's Corps. 1967-72. Assudate in the law firm of
Sheppard, l\Iullin, Richter & Hampton. Los Angeles, California, 191}4-Uij. B.A.,
1958, :\LA., 1969, and LL.B., 1964. Cni\'ersity of Southern California: LL.l\1.
1967. and J.S.D .• 1970, Yale University. l\lember of the Bar ~~r California.
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have imposed on states an obligation to take sides against
a state engaging in military aggression or other unlawful
warlike activity.
Professor Williams concludes that in fact the law of
neutrality has not changed so drastically. Member states
of the United Nations have a treaty obligation to carry
out orders of the Security Council, but otherwise may
remain neutral if they so desire. In reaching this conclusion, the author uses the contextual method of problem
solving though application of the goal-oriented decision
theory developed and refined by Professors McDougal,
Lasswell, and Reisman of Yale University, and other
scholars. Readers of the Military Law Review were introduced to this method and its specialized vocabulary in
Professor Walker's book review at 83 Mil. L. Rev. 131
(winter 1979).

I. INTRODUCTION
The thesis of this article is that, in the context of rapidly changing
technological, political and legal conditions in which modern armed
conflicts have occurred, the traditional rules of neutrality have in
practice altered substantially. However, any a priori conclusion
that the entire corpus of traditional neutrality law no longer operates might well be erroneous. A careful, detailed analysis of the
subject is required. This article assuredly does not present the
necessary definitive analysis of the many legal issues involved. Instead, it offers an impressionistic exploratory inquiry into certain
major issues, seeking to encourage the broad range of research required to develop definitive analysis useful both for governmental
advisors and legal scholars. The observational perspective of the
writer is that of a citizen of the world community recommending to
decision-makers policies reflecting community aspirations and appropriate outcomes of legal decisions calculated to implement those
policies more effectively.
The methodology 1 underlying this presentation has three aspects.
The first is a requirement for comprehensive factual analysis of
A concise discussion of the methodology used in this paper is presented in
McDougal, Lasswell, and Reisman, Theories Abont International Law: Prologue
1
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any particular instance of armed conflict-an analysis that is contextual, viewing that conflict within the context of the existing
global process of power in which states interact by various
strategies to secure and maintain effective power positions in their
relations. Next comes trend analysis of the course of decision on
legal claims concerning neutrality-an analysis that, as regards
past trends, properly considers the present and future effects of
new conditions pertinent to the conduct of modern armed conflicts.
Finally, there is need for policy-oriented analysis of trends of legal
decision-an appraisal of trends in light of advocated world community policies seeking the maximum international peace and security
reasonably attainable in this troubled world.
Only through application of such methodology may one expect to
determine accurately present developments in the rules of neutrality, to project those developments into the future, and to appraise the consequences of those developments. The traditional approach to neutrality was to create a model, the "status" of neutrality. That model subsumed, a priori, both an hypothesized view
of uniform attitude and conduct of all neutrals in all international
conflict situations, and a set of contentions as to legal outcomes of
decision on claims pertaining to neutrality. In turn, as this model
proved unsatisfactory when imposed upon the rich diversity of reality, officials and scholars created still other models, represented by
diverse terms, such as "differential neutrality" and "nonbelligerency", to describe gradations of attitude and conduct and
contentions as to resulting changes in legal outcome. 2
to a Coufiguratiue Jurispr11deuce, 8 Va. J. Int'l. L. 188 (1968), and in ~lcDougal,
Jurisprudeucefor a Free Society, 1 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (1966). Detailed application of
this approach is illustrated in McDougal and Feliciano, Law ami .\/i11i11111111 World
Public Order: The Legal Regulatiou of Iuteruatioual Coercion (1961). European
readers will find a discussion in .McDougal, luteruatioual Latt•, Potrer, and Pol·
icy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 Hague Recueil des Cours 137 (1953).
2 For discussion of one or more of these terms, see 2 Oppenheim, /uter11atiouai
Law (7th ed., H. Lauterpacht 1952); Tucker, The Lau· of War a11d Neutrality at
Sea (1957); Castrem, The Preseut Law of War aud Neutrality (1952); Greenspan,
The .lfoderu Law of Laud Wa~(are (1959); Bowett, Se(f·Defeuse in luten1ational
Law (1958); Kelsen, Priuciples of luteruatioual Law (2d ed., rev., Tucker 1967);
Lawrence, The Principles of I uteruatioual Law (1895); Brownlie, International
Law aud the Use of Force by States (1963); 11 Whiteman, Digest of luteruational
Law (1968); VII Hackworth, Digest of luteruatioual Law (1943); 2 Wheaton'sln·
teruatioual Law (A. Keith, £>d., 1944); Stone, Legal Controls of Juterllatiouai
Couflict (1954); Komarnicki, The Place of Nwtrality in the .1foderu System of
International Law, 80 Hague Recueil des Cours 395 (1952); Wilson, 'Nofl-
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The conflicting views 3 concerning the references of these terms,
both factual and legal, obviously cast doubt on the value of the
terms for policy and legal analysis. Also, legal literature tends to
use the terms interchangeably. 4 Yet, this babel of diverse, ambiguous terminology continues in the legal literature. Attempting to
work within the doctrinal confines of this diverse terminology is arguably futile. Neither the fluid reality of state attitude and conduct,
nor the multiple outcomes of legal decision on varied claims as to a
neutral's rights and duties in various conflict situations, can accurately be reflected in some frozen model, or series of models, represented by such terms. State officials may use such terms as crude
indicators of attitude and conduct, with at least implied assertions
of legality of their state's posture. However, the terminology appears useless as a departure point for legal analysis. In place of that
approach, we recommend the methodology set forth above.

II. THE PROCESS OF ARMED CONFLICT
Although, in theory, a future armed conflict could occur in which
all states participate directly by using military forces, the possibility is exceedingly remote, and would be a conflict in which the laws
of neutrality are irrelevant. Thus, for this discussion, it is assumed
that in any armed conflict certain states, varying in number, will
wish not to participate by employing military forces. Indeed, envisioning the normal conflict of the reasonably forseeable future to be
quite limited in the number of combatant states, the author
suggests that frequently the overwhelming majority of states will
wish to be "neutral."
This paper uses the term "neutral" merely to describe a state
that is not an active fighting participant in the conflict. Likewise,
here, the term "belligerent" merely describes a state that is employing its military forces in the conflict. State practice and schoBelligerency' in Relation to the Terminology of Neutrality, 30 American Joul'nnl
of International Law 121 (1941); and Kunz, 1\'eutrality aud the Eu1·opcau Wnr
1939-1940, 39 Michigan Law Review 179 (1941).

a E.g .• as regards "non-belligerency", see Oppenheim, supm note 2, at 654 n.J,
and Tucker, supra note 2, at 199 n.5.
E.g., Oppenheim, supra note 2, at 649; Castren, supra note 2, at 450-51; Stone,
supra note 2, at 365, 404.
4
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larly literature have used these terms to refer to widely varied conduct and attitudes, as well as subsuming varied legal outcomes. In
view of such confusing references, we might better depart from the
use of such terms as "neutral" and "belligerent," as we increasingly
have departed from use of the term "war." These terms unfortunately continue to carry connotations both of law and fact existing in
an earlier era, as well as twentieth century encrustations of competitive claims of law and policy made by state officials and scholars. As officials and scholars have moved to substitute the more
factually descriptive term "armed conflict" for "war," we might well
begin to use the terms "combatant" and "noncombatant state," or
"fighting'' and "nonfighting state," to reduce the risk of confusing
description of conduct with legal outcomes of decision regarding
permissible acts of a state as described.
To return to our discussion of the process of armed conflict, one
should note that the nature of the legal claims as to the rights and
duties of a neutral and of any of the belligerents will vary, depending upon the particular conflict. In large part, the appropriate application of law and policy as to those claims likewise varies. Thus, in
all instances, one must analyze the factual features of the particular
conflict process out of which arise claims pertaining to the laws of
neutrality. We suggest the following features of the conflict process
as a check list for use in comprehensively appraising relevant factors:
a. the relative power positions of the opposing sides in the conflict, and the relative power position of each belligerent side and of
each neutral (or association of neutrals);
b. the nature of past relationships of each belligerent and each
neutral;
c. the nature of the objectives for which each belligerent is employing military forces;
d. the geographical extent of the conflict, both in terms of the use
of military forces and of the consequences (political, economic, etc.)
resulting from the conflict;
e. the duration of the conflict;
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f. the "crisis" level-the level of expectation that a belligerent or
neutral will suffer imminent, serious loss from the conflict unless it
takes avoidance action; and
g. the nature of the military weaponry employed, with emphasis
on its range, accuracy, area of impact, and specialized destructive
capabilities. In any particular conflict situation any or all of these
features may play an important role in the attitude and conduct of
each belligerent and of each neutral in their relations inte1· se, in the
types of legal claims that either will raise, and in the outcome of
legal decision on those claims.
Any particular armed conflict occurs within the broader context
of the global power process in which states seek to increase or maintain positions of power through the use of diplomatic, ideological,
economic and military strategies. Contextual conditions that may
influence conduct of belligerents and neutrals, the nature of claims
about this conduct, and the outcomes of decision on those claims
include:
a. the continued, albeit somewhat muted global competition for
power between the United States and the Soviet Union, now become a triangular competition (in some regions) with inclusion of the
People's Republic of China;
b. the relationship of each belligerent and each neutral with other
neutrals, raising questions of conflicting obligations and of the potential for widened participation in the conflict or the triggering of
new but related conflicts, and
c. changing perspectives and practices in the conduct of armed
conflict, e.g., mass mobilization of human and physical resources,
elimination of the resource base of the opponent (economic warfare),
and rapidly developing military technology increasingly emphasizing indirect, less discriminate modes of broad area destruction of
life and property.

III. BASIC COMMUNITY POLICIES CONCERNING
NEUTRALITY
Outlined here are the general world community policies involved
in considering claims pertaining to neutrality. In discussing the

14
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trends of decision on certain selected claims, we will specify policy
in greater detail in appraising those trends and making recommendations for future decision.
In any modern international conflict, claims may refer to the
question of whether a particular state is required by international
law to participate in some manner in that conflict, i.e., to depart
from what otherwise would be the requirements of the traditional
laws of neutrality. This has to do with the question of each state's
responsibility for supporting international public order. The overwhelming bulk of the claims, however, will refer to various aspects
of interaction of belligerent and neutral. In either situation of claim,
the principal community policies involved in legal decision are:
a. the widest necessary assumption of state responsibility to act
for the world community in insuring that sufficient power is
mobilized and used to overcome a belligerent that has resorted unlawfully to the use of armed force, and
b. the achievement of objectives for which armed force is lawfully
employed with the minimum necessary consumption or destruction
of human and material resources.
As to the policy of assumption of responsibility to maintain world
public order, that policy may apply differently, depending. upon
whether the organized community has or has not determined the
lawfulness of the particular use of armed force. Where the United
Nations Security Council or General Assembly (e.g., the latter acting in appropriate circumstances under the "Uniting for Peace"
Resolution 5 ) has characterized a belligerent's conduct as unlawful,
the author urges that the principle of community responsibility is
applicable. This is so regardless of whether any call upon states to
take some specific action is viewed as a controlling decision or as a
recommendation. In either event, the characterization of a belligerent's conduct as unlawful would be authoritative, since it would be
rendered on behalf of the world community under authority of the
United Nations Charter. 6 Pertinent to policy as to neutrality, community policy calls for the widest necessary participation in placing
5

G.A. Res. 377, 5 C'.::\. GAOR, Supp. (::\o.

6

:'lie Dougal and Feliciano.

-~"ln·a

~ll)

HI, l'.::\. Do<:. A 1775 !195liJ.

note 1, at 410.
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the required resources at the disposal of those acting on behalf of
the community to apply sanctions against an unlawful belligerent.
This obviously proposes discrimination in favor of and assistance to
the belligerents acting for the community, and might take any form,
from military activity to economic and other nonmilitary assistance.
However, the policy of minimum consumption or destruction of
resources also applies here. Necessarily, armed force will occasionally be required to maintain public order in the world community, us
in national communities. Yet, absent the extreme of allencompassing global conflict, all states need not, and should not,
participate in a conflict situation. The United Nations Charter expressly recognizes the possibility that various Member States might
remain neutral in the event of United Nations action to maintain
public order. Article 48 states that,
The action required to carry out the decision of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace
and security shall be taken by all the Members of the
United Nations or by some of them, as the Security
Council may determine. 7
A guiding principle of sanctioning strategy is to terminate an unlawful use of force promptly and economically-the principle of
economy in the use of force. We refer not just to the waste resulting
from consumption of resources by unnecessary state involvement in
conflicts. More important, perhaps, is the danger of increased destruction due to spread of the conflict because of unnecessary participation. Also, in certain instances, the concern for minimizing destruction will excuse a state from discrimination against an unlawful
belligerent where that state is especially subject to destructive retaliation by an aggressor (e.g., a weak state bordering upon u much
more powerful aggressor). 8
Thus, the nature of participation by each state in community action against an aggressor, or in other community use of force,
should vary, depending on that state's capabilities; the require7

Emphasis added.

8

See Komarnicki, supra note 2, at 479.
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ments for assistance present in the particular situation (e.g., base
facilities; rights of transit; provision of supplies, or perhaps, merely
diplomatic support), and other factors. Perhaps in many instances
the situation will not require from the great majority of states any
conduct that departs from the standards set under the laws of neutrality.
Neutrality may be useful to the world community in other respects. The situation of "permanent or perpetual neutrality" 9 of
some states, such as that of Switzerland and Austria, may indeed be
useful in the maintenance of public order. Generally, a state has
accepted the obligation of permanent neutrality pursuant to an international agreement wherein other states agree to protect the
state's territory and independence. 10 The United Nations Charter
does not refer explicitly to the question of admission of a permanently neutralized State. At the 1945 San Francisco Conference on
the drafting of the Charter, the view that permanent neutrality of a
state would be incompatible with obligations under the Charter received much support. 11 Nevertheless, Austria was admitted to the
United Nations despite its announced policy of permanent neutrality.
The permanent neutrality of a state appears to be acceptable
under the United Nations Charter, if the Security Council agrees. 12
As we discussed earlier, Article 48 of the Charter authorizes the
Security Council to consider the special needs of certain states. 13 A
permanently neutral state may by its location serve as a "security
buffer'' between other states that fear attack from each other. Further, the need for mediators, for channels of communication between opposing belligerents, for "Protecting Powers" under the
1949 Geneva Conventions for the protection of noncombatants, or
Castr(m, supra note 2, at 449; Oppenheim, supra note 2, at 661; Ogley, The
Theory and Practice of Neutrality i11 the Tu·e11tieth Ce11t11ry 3 (1970).
9

1°Black, et al;, Xeutralization a11d World Politics xi (1968).
6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 459-60. See Kelsen, The Lau· of the Uuited .\'atio11s 94
(1951); Bowett, supra note 2, at 174.
11

12 Verdross, Austria's Permanent Xeutrality aud the r'uitcci .\'atious Organi:atiou, 50 Am. J. Int'l L. 61, 67 (1956); Kunz, Austria's Perma11e11t .\'eutrality, 50
Am J. Int'l. L. 418 (1956).

13

Lalive, International Organizations and Ne11trality, 24 Brit. Y.B. lnt'l. L. 72,

88 (1974).
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for a location for negotiations, are but a few of the "infrastructure"
supports assisting the cause of minimizing adverse affects of conflict
and facilitating the restoration of public order that can be provided
more easily by a permanently neutral state.
Regardless of the question of requiring affirmative discriminatory
support from states against an aggressor state or other state that is
the target of community approved military sanctions, community
policy requires that, at the minimum, neutral states should not actively hinder community efforts and should not actively aid the aggressor. Even to that extent, community policy would suggest altering traditional neutrality law, since under that law certain assistance could be provided to a belligerent by a neutral, as long as
the neutral offered it equally to all belligerents.
The foregoing discussion has focused on the situation where the
organized community has characterized the use of force by belligerents as legal or illegal. From perspectives of community policy,
what is the result if this has not occurred? On the one hand, one
might argue that all states should be strictly impartial vis-a-vis the
belligerents. Conflicting views could result from each state deciding
for itself which side in the conflict lawfully is using force, and lead
to broadened conflicts that might disrupt the still fragile United Nations Organization. A similar argument could be made concerning
"regional" neutrality in the settling of a conflict between members
of a regional organization such as the Organization of American
States or the Organization of Mrican Unity.)
On the other hand, the firmly established recognition of the right
of collective self-defense shows that the world community already
authorizes third states not only to take discriminatory action as
nonparticipants in a conflict, but even to launch military forces
against an aggressor, on the basis of individual state characterization of the lawfulness of each belligerent's use of force. This is so,
albeit the state's characterization is provisional, and action is taken
at its peril, since its conclusion is subject to the appraisal of other
states, and possibly, to subsequent review by the United Nations
Security Council or other agencies of the organized community.
The community policy that supports direct military participation
in collective self-defense, and discriminatory action by a neutral
against the belligerent characterized by the neutral as the aggressor, is the same-the common interest in maintaining international
18
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peace and security. Although individual characterization is more
subject to abuse or error, the price of foreclosing a neutral state
from engaging in discriminatory conduct on that basis is the sacrifice of perhaps essential assistance in maintaining public order.
Ultimately, the question concerns the risks involved in decentralized community action to maintain public order against challenges of unlawful use of force, versus the risks involved in permitting successful uses of unlawful force, including the risk of repudiating rules restraining the uses of force. These rules have been
established only recently at the price of enormous human suffering
and destruction of resources on a global scale. Further, it should be
pointed out that in many instances of armed conflict the facts clearly
will show the identity of the aggressor. Even if a situation of uncertainty calls for initial suspension of judgment, the subsequent conduct of each belligerent, e.g., the nature of announced or implicit
objectives; the proportionality of use of force; efforts to achieve
earliest termination of the conflict and to resort to other means of
resolving disputes, and acceptance of organized community efforts
to achieve settlement, should serve to clarify "the identity of the aggressor.
If, indeed, there are instances of true uncertainty or of essentially
equal fault, those exceptional cases would not justify policy foreclosing individual state action in support of international law in all
instances. Finally, we might also comment that past experience has
not indicated such a massive "rush to judgment," as is envisioned by
the argument calling for impartiality of states in the absence of organized community characterization. On the contrary, in many past
situations clearly calling for support in maintaining international
peace and security, we have seen a lamentable failure of such support, in that all too many states prefer noninvolvement at the risk of
the defeat of community interests.

IV. TRENDS OF DECISION ON SELECTED CLAIMS:
APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATION

A. CLAIMS AS TO SHARED RESPONSIBILITY IN
THE SUPPORT OF PUBLIC ORDER
A major claim concerning the present development of the rules of
neutrality in modern armed conflicts concerns whether, indeed, a
19
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state presently has the right to be impartial toward all belligerents
in the conflict. Does modern customary international law, or the
United Nations Charter, require states to discriminate against an
unlawful belligerent? Any significant work of legal scholarship considers this claim. 14 However, we note that these writings generally
pass over the problem, implicitly assuming an affirmative response
to the question whether, under traditional neutrality law, a state
indeed had a right to be impartial. Scholarly literature seems to
assume that was the case, and now directs attention to the question
of whether a neutral now is under a duty of partiality.
Proper assessment of the present trend of decision requires
awareness that under traditional international law a state lawfully
could resort to the use of force for whatever purpose it chose. A
state permissibly could use force to defend itself or other states
from prior armed attack, or otherwise to maintain its position of
power, or to expand its power position at the expense, even the
extinction, of other states. Since, in theory, any state lawfully could
be the target of armed force, a state was allowed to be neutral at
the sufferance of the belligerent states; permitted to be a nonparticipant in the conflict. Likewise, any state, even if the belligerents
in a conflict were willing to allow it to be neutral, lawfully could
choose to become a belligerent.
Thus, neutrality was essentially contractual, albeit that "offer
and acceptance" normally were most implicit in any instance of neutrality. Likewise, with freedom to force a neutral at any time to
become a belligerent by attacking it, or with the freedom of a neutral to become a belligerent at any time by entering its military
forces in the conflict, 15 the specific conduct indulged in by any particular neutral vis-a-vis any particular belligerent might vary depending upon the triangular power relationship of the opposing belligerent sides and of the neutral. Potentially, a broad range of conduct partial to one of the opposing belligerent sides was possible in
this essentially contractual process of neutrality. That a substantial
amount of uniformity of expectation developed in the nineteenth
14

E.g., McDougal and Feliciano, 1m pm note 1; Oppenheim,
supra note 2; Castr{m, supra note 2.

1111 pl"tl

nott• 2; Tut·kl'l',

Komarnicki, supra note 2, at 402; Orvik, The Derliue of Xculra/iiJI l!lll-1/lll
at 28 (1971); Schwarzenberger, lulerualioual La11' as Applied b11 /ult·rullll!mal
Courts aud Tribuuals: The LaU' of Armed Cou.f7irl 573 (1968).
15
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century as to the generally appropriate range of conduct of neutral
and belligerent in their relations was due to the fairly uniform features of armed conflicts of that period: (a) quite limited objectives
for the use of armed force; (b) the limited mobilization of resources;
(c) the limited quantum of personal and equipment employed in actual combat; and (d) the limited extent and ambit of destruction resulting from military strategies.
Under traditional neutrality law, then, a neutral in reality had not
the right, but the duty of impartiality (perhaps varying in extent in
a particular conflict due to the actual process of interaction with
opposing belligerents) that arose due to the implicit contractual
basis of neutrality. This duty was the quid pro quo for the forbearance of belligerents from forcing the neutral to become a belligerent
by attacking it: "[t]he classical and positivist conception of neutrality which developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
was one of complete impartiality towards the parties to any conflict
unless a treaty of alliance modified the position. The foundation of
the doctrine of absolute neutrality was the absolute right of the
state to resort to war." 16
The fact that under the traditional law of neutrality a neutral did
not have the right to be impartial, but rather, had a duty of impartiality, should serve to emphasize how significant would be the
quantum leap in the development of international law if, today, one
could conclude that under customary international law states are
under the quite opposite duty of partiality against the belligerent
who is the aggressor in an armed conflict. We should note that only
in this century, in the lifetime of many now living, with the development of the rule prohibiting use of armed force except for
self-defense or other community authorized purposes, could one
say that a state had, under general international law, a right to be a
neutral, and further, a right to be as impartial as it pleased toward
the belligerents. The use of armed force against a state not wishing
to join or assist either side of a conflict would, under the general
rule prohibiting use of force, be unlawful. Implicit in the statement
that the rule against unauthorized use of force exists is the assumption that, generally, a state unlawfully using force will be subject to
effective sanctions, whether employed by centralized or decen16
Brownlie, supra note 2, at 402. See also Oppenheim, supra note 2, at 653;
Tucker, supra note 2 at 204.
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tralized community action. A state giving assistance to an aggressor
likewise would be subject to proportionate sanctions.
Thus, absent some additional fundamental change in international
law, one could conclude that under customary international law each
state today has a duty not to assist an agressor state, but also the
right not to assist any belligerent. The question is whether the
present trend of decision has moved beyond this point to reflect a
still more intense development of community identifications and expectations premised on common interest, by establishing a duty of
affirmative partiality-an obligation to provide affirmative assistance to those belligerents combating an unlawful disrupter of public
order.
The present trend of decision is that, absent a controlling decision
of the United Nations Security Council acting under Article 39 of
the United Nations Charter, a state is under no duty to take a position of affirmative partiality toward either belligerent side in a conflict. Other writers 17 have in detail presented the past trend of decision starting with the Covenant of the League of Nations, then
moving foward to the Pact of Paris of 1928 (the Kellogg-Briand
Pact), the pre-World War II practice, the United Nations Charter,
and subsequent state practice. We merely map out salient details
here:

Covenant of the League of Nations. 18

1.

Under the Covenant, each member was at most required not to
hinder action by others in support of the Covenant, and not to provide assistance to a state that violated the Covenant. The League
Council could determine whether there had been a prohibited resort
to war (Article 10), but each member was free to decide whether
circumstances required it to participate in the economic or other
17

See, e.g., authorities cited at note 14, supra.

18 See discussion of the Covenant and its effect on the laws of neutrality in
McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 420-22; Oppenheim, supra note 2, at
645-46; Komarnicki, supra note 2, at 422; Graham, The E.ffect of the League of
.Vatiou.~ Cot•enaut ou the Theory and Practice of Neutrality, 15 Calif. L. Rev. 357
(1927); Kunz, The Covenant of the League of Nations and Neutrality, 29 Proc.
Am. Soc. lnt'l. L. 36 (1935).
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sanctions recommended by the Council under Article 16 of the Covenant.19 Thus, a member was free both to be a neutral (nonparticipant in use of force) and to be as impartial as it chose, regardless of
the Council's decision. 20 In armed conflicts during the League's existence, 21 various members of the League declared neutrality and
many agreements during the period provided for the possibility of
neutrality in future conflicts. In the 1930's, with the acts of aggression by Italy, Japan and Germany, the expectations of League effectiveness "declined steadily until the vanishing point was reached." 22
Many states claimed neutrality as the clouds of major war grew
darker, or at the outbreak of World War II.

2. Pact of Paris.
Article 1 of the 1928 General Treaty for the Reuniciation of War
as an Instrument of National Policy, 23 generally known as the Pact
of Paris or the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, states:
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the
names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in
their relations with one another.
The Pact does not refer to the concept of neutrality. 24 The International Law Association in its Budapest Articles of Interpretation
1

9Kelsen, supra note 2, at 170 n.167.

20

0ppenheim, supra note 2, at 646.

Examples include the 1921 war between Greece and Turkey, in which the Allied
Powers issued a collective declaration of neutrality; the Chaco War between
Paraguay and Bolivia, in which all neighboring states, who were League members, declared their neutrality; and the Italian-Ethiopian War, in which Albania,
Austria, and Hungary refused to agree with the Council's conclusion that Italy
had violated the Covenant.

21

22

McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 423.

General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy,
Aug. 27, 1938, 45 Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
23

24 Lauterpacht, The Pact of Paris and the Budapest Artides of l11lerpretatiuu, 20
Transactions of the Grotius Society 178 (1934); Brownlie, supra note 2, at 403.
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adopted in 1934, considered that the Pact authorized the parties to
act contrary to the duties of neutrals. 25 This view has been chal·
lenged. For example, Castren maintained that the Pact of Paris
"had no effect on the law of neutrality." 26 The present writer does
not concur.
Assuredly, the parties to the Pact assumed no commitment to im·
pose sanctions against one who violated the agreement. Therefore,
neutrality in an armed conflict was permissible. 27 However, the
Pact rejected the fundamental basis of the traditional law of neu·
trality, "the unrestricted right of sovereign States to go to war." 28
In establishing the bellum justum doctrine as a legal concept, 20 the
Pact certainly expanded the permissible uses of coercion in response
to unlawful use of force. Any party was authorized to determine if
there had been a breach and to take action against the violator,
whether as a belligerent or as a neutral taking some discriminatory
action.
United States officials relied on the competence of individual
league members to employ sanctions for violations of the Pact while
the United States was still a neutral in the early stages of World
War II. Thus, the 1940 United Kingdom-United States "destroyers
for bases" agreement 30 and the passage of the 1941 Lend Lease
Act 31 were justified as permissible discrimination for violation of
the Pact:
A system of international law which can impose no penalty on a law breaker and also forbids other states to aid
the victim would be self-defeating and should not help
25

38 Int'l. L. Assn. Rep. 66-67 (1935).

26

Castren, supra note 2, at 432.

27

Kelsen, supra note 2, at 168; Tucker, supra note 2, at 168.

28

Oppenheim, supra note 2, at 643.

Brierly, Some Implications o.fthe Pact o.f Paris, 10 Brit. Y.B. Int'J. L. 208, 210
(1929); Wright, The Meaning o.fthe Pact o.f Paris, 27 Am. J. Int'l. L. 39, 61 (1933).

29

30 0.fficial Documents: Great Britain-United States, Exchange o.f Naval all({ Air
Bases for Ot•er-Age Destroyers, 34 Am. J. Int'J. L. Supp. 184 (1940).

31

Act of Mar. 11, 1941, ch. 11, 55 Stat. 31.
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even a little to realize mankind's hope for enduring
peace. 32
3. The United Nations Charter.
The development of the general rule prohibiting resort to armed
force except for individual or collective self-defense or other community approved objectives was a fundamental step in implementing the policy of maintaining public order. The second fundamental
step, at least in terms of formal authority, was the creation of the
system of the United Nations Charter for centralized decisionmaking as to the lawfulness of the use of force, and for community
coordination in the employment of the use of force and other
strategies to maintain international peace and security.
Unquestionably, the United Nations, when acting, inter alia,
under Articles 39, 33 25, 34 and 2(5) 35 of the Charter, would have the
authoritative competence to determine which states are to give assistance, and what forms of assistance are to be used to maintain
international peace and security. 36 Further, under Article 53, the
Security Council could call upon regional organizations to implement
United Nations policies, and in turn to use regional charter authorizations. Under the Charter arrangement, then, members are free to
refrain from participating in community action against an agressor
only to the extent permitted by the Security Council. 37 Article 2(5)
32

Statement of U.S. Attorney General to the Senate Committee ou Fureigu Relations in Support of the Lend Lease Act, S. Rep. No. 45, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1941). See Tucker, supra note 2, at 169 n.10; McDougal and Feliciano, supra note
1, at 425.

This article establishes the decisional power of the United Nations Security
Council.

33

34

ln this article the member states of the United Nations commit themseh·es to
accept and carry out Security Council decisions.

35 This

article obliges member states to give the United Nations "'every assistance" in actions taken under the Charter, and to refrain from giving assistance to
any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement
action.

36

Greenspan, supra note 2, at 522.

37

Id .; Oppenheim, supra note 2, at 647.
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reinforces what already should be viewed as the duty under customary law to refrain from giving assistance to the aggressor.
The recent and continuing problem, primarily due to the global
power competition of the United States and the Soviet Union,
joined now by the People's Republic of China, has been that this
system of centralized community characterization, direction and
coordination of effort has failed to function. Fault for this failure
does not rest entirely on the shoulders of the more powerful states.
All states generally have been reluctant to commit military forces or
other resources to support community action unless their intersts
are most directly and immediately seen to be adversely affected if
action is not taken. 38 The result is that even when the Security
Council does act, the usual outcome is a recommendation to States,
leaving to each state the discretion to support the community effort.
(This is necessarily the result also under the solely recommending
authority of the General Assembly.)
Thus, the outcome is now similar to that under the League of
Nations, with at most a duty of passive discrimination, i.e., nonassistance to an unlawful belligerent, if so characterized by United
Nations action. 39 Absent an ad hoc concurrence of interests of thl'
permanent members of the Security Council, sufficient to allow a
controlling decision under Article 39, which in the foreseeable future will be a rare event, states will continue to be under no duty of
affirmative partiality, to provide assistance on a discriminatory
basis to states engaged in armed conflict in support of international
peace and security. They will be free to be impartial toward all belligerents, or to choose on the basis of individual characterization to
discriminate against the side viewed as the aggressor. State practice in the Charter period indicates that many member states have
elected to continue as impartial neutrals in armed conflicts, e.g., the
Arab-Israeli Wars. 40 This has been the case even where there has
been a community determination of aggression, but no obligatory
call to action. During the United Nations involvement in Korea,
many members adopted a position of impartial neutrality. 41

-----------------------------------------------------38

See discussion and authorities cited in Williams, /ulcrrJot•erutlll'lllal ,\ll!tlcll'lf

Forces aud World Public- Order ch. 6 (1971).
39

McDougal and Feliciano, supra note I, at 430.

40 Norton, Bel!l'eeu !he ldeologJI n11d !he Realil!f: Thl' Shnclow of !he lAIII' 1!1
lralil!/, 17 Har. Int'l. L. J. 249, 257-261 (1976).

41

Greenspan, supra note 2, at 525-26; Norton, supra note 40, at 265-H7.
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That our advocated community policy of widest assumption of
necessary responsibility for maintaining world public order has
been, and for the foreseeable future will continue to be, most unsatisfactorily implemented, seems a commonplace observation. Yet
we must constantly reiterate to authoritative decision-makers,
primarily the principal national officials, that a public order system
that leaves participation in community action to terminate unlawful
use of force solely to the election of each member state is fraught
with the same risks that have in this century resulted in so much
suffering and destruction. The author urges that national officials
recognize that ultimately the maximum preservation of human values results, first, from deterrence of unlawful force and, second,
from its speediest termination. Eventual effective implementation
of the community policy advocated herein calls for unflagging emphasis on community identifications and common interests. Needed
are prespectives that will result in acceptance of commitments to
participate in community action to maintain public order, and to
place claims as to neutrality, or nonparticipation, within the
framework of appraisal of the requirements for maintaining international peace and security.

B. SELECTED CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF
BELLIGERENT-NEUTRAL RELATIONS.
From discussion on neutrality and the claim of shared responsibility to support world public order, we turn to discussion of
selected claims arising out of belligerent-neutral relations in modern
armed conflicts.
Claims conceming neutral abstention fJ·om di1·ect militm·y aid tu
the enemy.

1.

Traditionally, a belligerent's major area of concern as to a neutral's
conduct has been whether the neutral is providing military aid to an
opposing belligerent. The two principal specific claims concern: (a)
providing military personnel, and (b) providing military equipment.
a. Military personnel.

Until the early nineteenth century, a neutral state permissibly
could provide military personnel to either side in a conflict, as long
27
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as the neutral offered the belligerents equal opportunity to bid for
their use. 42 Many states did not maintain sufficient military forces
for wartime needs, but instead hired mercenaries as the need arose.
On the other hand, neutral states needed funds to maintain their
military personnel, and occasions to keep up their military readiness
when those states were not engaged in conflict. Thus, nondiscriminatory provision of military forces by a neutral was permissible, since it was mutually advantageous to all.
During the nineteenth century the rule changed, due in part to
development of large national military forces, but also in larger part
to the establishment of the European "balance of power." That regime encouraged limiting the number of state participants in a conflict, as well as limiting the objectives of resort to force, to prevent
substantial imbalance within the system. By World War I, neutral
state provision of military forces was impermissible. 43 In World
War II, when the Spanish Government sent the "Blue Division"
(consisting of some volunteers, but primarily of regular Spanish
military personnel) to serve with German forces on the Russian
front, the Allied Powers protested and demanded the withdrawal of
the Division. Spain did so, although some volunteers remained as a
"Spanish Legion" under German military command. 44
Reference to the "Spanish Legion" illustrates a distinction between "state action" and "private action" under traditional international law. Thus, while neutral state action in sending military
forces to aid a belligerent became impermissible, private nationals
or residents could join a belligerent's forces as volunteers. Article 6
of Hague Convention V45 provides, "The responsibility of a neutral
Power is not engaged by the fact of persons crossing the frontier
separately to offer their services to one of the belligerents." Underlying this state-private dichotomy was the nineteenth century
42

0ppenheim, supra note 2, at 675.

3 Hyde, luteruatioual Law 2231-32 (2d ed. rev. 1954); Norton, supra note 37,
at 279.

43

44 Royal Institute of International Affairs, The War and the Neutrals: Survey of
luteruatioual Affairs, 1939-1946 at 285, 301-02 (1956); Fox, The Power of Small
States 160, 169, 173-74 (1959).

Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers• and
Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310, T.S. No. 540.

45
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perspective of limited state control over persons, one aspect of the
general "laissex faire concept of the relationship of citizen to state."46
During conflicts in this century, there have been various instances of private citizens joining the belligerents at times when
their state was neutral. 47 This state-private dichotomy presents
states with the opportunity to send military forces to aid a belligerent behind the facade of "volunteerism." The most blatant case of
state action under claim of private action is that of the People's Republic of China sending hundreds of thousands of organized,
equipped, and continuously supplied military personnel to fight the
United Nations forces in Korea, yet referring to those personnel as
"volunteers. 48 This claim was rejected by the General Assembly in
its determination that the People's Republic of China was an aggressor in Korea. 49 Other recent instances of substantial neutral
state involvement in raising, training, and financing military forces
said to be volunteers have occurred. 50 Regardless of whether the
individuals involved may wish to engage in the conflict (i.e.,
whether they have "volunteered"), the relevant point is the degree
of neutral state assistance in facilitating their participation in the
conflict.
However, of more basic concern is whether the trend of decision
in practice still honors the above-cited Article 6 of Hague Convention V which excuses the neutral state from responsibility for taking
action to prevent its citizens or those otherwise subject to its con46

Norton, supra note 40, at 282; Stone, supra note 2, at 408.

47

Examples include the Escadrille Americans in World War I, \'arious groups in
the Spanish Civil War, the "Flying Tigers" in China in the 1930's, American volunteers with Canadian and British forces in World War II before the United
States' entry as a belligerent, and foreign \'olunteer enlistments on both sides in
the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. See Norton, .~upra note 40, at 279-82.

48

Statement of 1\lr. Wu Hsiu-Chuan, representati\'e of the People's Republic of
China, in support of Complaint of Aggression Upon the Republic of Korea, and
Complaint of Armed Invasion of Taiwan (Formosa), 5 U.N. SCOR (527th mtg.)
22-23, U.N. Doc. S/p. v. 527 (1950).
G.A. Res. 498(V), 5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20A), U.N. Doc. A.I17751Add. 1, at
1 (1951). See discussion in McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 465-66.

49

See discussion of the U .S.-financed participation of se\'eral thousand Thai
troops in Laos in the early 1970's, during the Indochina War, in Norton, supra
note 37, at 280-81.

50
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trol from joining the belligerent of their choice. With the termination of the underlying condition upon which the rule was premised,
i.e., the quite restrictive nineteenth century view of the ambit of
state control over the individual, state support for the rule would
seem greatly eroded.
Today, all governments exercise substantial control over the activities of citizens affecting the national interest, especially in the
area of foreign relations. National laws quite commonly forbid joining the military forces of other countries, especially to engage in
conflicts. 51 This common practice of control over citizens in areas
affecting the public interest has already in other situations given
rise to perspectives of increased duty of control where the state has
reasonable notice of inimical acts that persons within its territory
plan to take against another state, and reasonable ability to prevent
them. Examples include international cooperation to deal with the narcotics trade, counterfeiting, terrorism, and aircraft hijacking.
One may suggest that the trend of decision has repudiated the
"state-private" dichotomy, to the extent that a neutral state is
under a duty to use reasonable efforts to prevent its citizens or
others subject to its control from joining either belligerent. 5 2 Community policy would appear to promote this result. Traditional international law sought to balance the interest of the belligerent in
military effectiveness and the interest of the neutral in avoiding deprivations in its internal or external activities due to the conflict. In
effect, this was another illustration of the development of customary law pertaining to armed conflicts by balancing against each
other the policies of military effectiveness and of minimal destruction of values. The object was to restrict as much as possible the
scope of the conflict and the number of participants, and to promote
to the greatest extent possible continued normalcy in the activities
of neutrals.
Although acceptable conduct of a neutral vis-a-vis either belligerent might well vary in the particular conflict situation, most asBrownlie, Volunteers and the Laze of War and Neutrality, 5 Int. and Comp.
Law Q. 570, 575-79 (1956); McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 467-68.

51

52 /d.; Friedmann, The Grozcth of State Control o!'er the lndil'idual, and its El~
feels upon the Rules of luteruational State Responsibility, XIX Brit. )'.B. Int'l.

L. 118, 137 (1938), contends for this outcome. We would submit that this is todny
the trend of decision.
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suredly the principal expectation was that a neutral would not provide direct military aid to the enemy. The neutral was to avoid
action that altered the relative positions of power of the belligerents, the military balance. Whether neutral state personnel are
sent, or are permitted to depart to join belligerent forces, it would
seem that some contribution to that belligerent's military position
occurs, and in today's situation of pervasive control over the incHvidual's transnational movements, this should be viewed as "state
action." In view of the great size of the standing armies maintained
by many states, the number of such private volunteers may seem
insignificant; but, especially in wars between the smaller, less developed states, well trained foreign military personnel may be very
valuable to a belligerent.
The concern of the African states about foreign military personnel, most recently displayed in the Angolan criminal trials of several
mercenaries, undoubtedly is due in part to deep-seated hostilities
felt toward former colonial states and toward Western society, generally, as well as to suspicion that non-African states are attempting
to intervene in African affairs. However, this concern may also reflect the view that a relatively few foreign military experts could
substantially alter the military balance in a conflict.
Although not actually an exception to the rules prohibiting provision of military personnel or war material, neutral states and their
citizens may provide humanitarian relief assistance, e.g., through
their Red Cross Services, 53 without violating their obligations as
neutrals.
b. Provision Q(War Material.
The traditional nineteenth century rule was that neutrals were
forbidden from supplying, directly or indirectly, a belligerent with
"war-ships, ammunition, or war material of any kind whatever."54
53 E.g.,

Art. 27, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of th(•
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, AuR. 12. 1949. 6 l'.S.T. 3114,
T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Art. 25, Geneva Convention forth(' Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked !\!embers of Armed
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217. T.I.A.S. 3363, 75 l'.N.T.S. 85.

6, Hague Convention (XIII) Concerning the Rights and Duties of !l:eutral
Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415, T.S. No. 5-15; Art. 16, Havana
Convention of Maritime Neutrality, Feb. 20, 1928, 4 Hudson, lulcruatioual
Legislatiou 2401 (1931).
54 Art.
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Generally, also, the neutral was required to deny a belligerent the
use of the neutral's public agencies and its financial, industrial and
transportation facilities. 55 This requirement was seen as a vital aspect of the duty of impartiality. Similar to the "state-private"
dichotomy discussed as to provision of military personnel, the neutral state was not required to prevent private citizens from supplying arms, other material assistance, or firearms. For example, Article 7 of Hague Convention XIII provides, "A neutral Power is not
bound to prevent the export or transit, for the use of either belligerent, of arms, ammunition, or, in general, of anything which could
be of use to an army or fleet." 56
As was mentioned above, in respect to the question of provision of
military personnel, and as others have pointed out, this dichotomy
resulted from "the particular conceptions of public order, or economic organization and social structure" 57 existing in Western
Europe and the United States in the nineteenth century. These conceptions have altered fundamentally during this century. Especially
as to state regulation of the international movement of war materiel, the trend is toward intense regulation. 58 Certainly, in those
states where all or most international transfer of goods is handled
by state trading organizations, any provision of material assistance
to a belligerent would be "state action." However, in view of the
general exercise by all states of comprehensive regulation over
foreign trading, it may be said that state action is involved today in
any authorization for international movement of goods. "The
suggestion, most briefly put, is that responsibility must bear reasonable relation to actual control." 59
The present trend of decision, expressed in state legislation and
in practice during post-World War II conflicts, is for states who
~~a

Hyde, supm note 43, at 2231-32; Oppenheim,
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54, supra. See also Art. 22, Havana Convention, nupJ'CI note 6,1: VII
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assert neutrality to prohibit transfer of war materials by their private citizens. 60 We suggest that the developing trend of customary
law is that a neutral state is under a duty to take all reasonable
measures to prevent provision of materials and other a..~istance to a
belligerent by individuals and associations under its control.
2. Claims concerning prevention of belligaent use of neutml ten·itory to further military objectives.
Another major class of claims deals with prevention by a neutral
of the belligerent's use of the neutral's territory to aid in achieving
military objectives. The two principal subject matter areas covered
by these claims are, first, transit of belligerent forces across neutral
territory, and second, use of neutral territory for bases of operation or
staging areas for launching operations, or supp01t areas to sustain operations elsewhere. We are concerned here with activities of a belligerent within land, air and maritime territory of the neutral, which an
opposing belligerent claims the neutral must prevent.
Community policies involved here are again, the policy of military
effectiveness versus the policy of minimal disruption of values. The
principle of effectiveness calls for prevention or termination of belligerent activities within neutral territory that adversely affect the
military balance between opposing belligerents. This reduces the
chances of involvement of neutral territory in armed attack by the
complainant belligerent, and thus promotes minimal destruction.
The deference to competency of the neutral to control conduct
within its territory gives rise to expectations that the neutral will
prevent improper belligerent use of the neutral's territory.
a. Transit of bellige1·ent fo1-ces.
A traditional claim dealt with transit of belligerent forces or war
materials across neutral territory. Customary law obligated the
neutral to prevent such belligerent activity. This was reflected in
Article 2, Hague Convention V, 61 forbidding belligerents to move
convoys of "munitions of war or supplies" across neutral territory,
while Article 5 of that Convention forbade neutrals from allowing
60 See

Xorton,

Sllfll'a

note 40, at 298

t·l s(·q
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~ur\·ey

of mu~t recent practict.-.

Hague Com·ention (\') Re~pecting the Right~ and Dutil's uf X t,-Utral Powers ami
Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18. 19ll7, 36 Stat. 231U, T.S. Xu. 5411.
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belligerents to perform such acts. The customary rule applies both
to land and aerial transit.
This duty generally was adhered to in World Wars I and II, 62 and
has continued to be asserted. For example, Ceylon refused to allow
its territory to be transited to allow Indonesia to supply Pakistan in
the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. 63 The Arab League and Indonesia
asserted this duty as a basis for denying transit facilities to the
United Nations in the Korean War, 64 although in view of Security
Council and General Assembly characterizations of actions by North
Korea and the People's Republic of China as aggression, it would
not appear accurate to refer to this as a duty in that instance. Denial of transit facilities to the United Nations in that case was a
permissible exercise of the option not to assist military operations
conducted on behalf of the community. (Note the earlier discussion
of this option, above.)
During the 1973 Yom Kippur War involving Israel, Egypt, and
Syria as belligerents, various states allowed their territory to be
used as refueling points for United States ships and planes enroute
to Israel with military equipment, or to be used for removal of materials stored there in United States bases. 65 However, after Arab
states protested and stated that permission for transit of war
supplies would be considered in applying an oil embargo, most
NATO member states and Spain terminated their permission, relying on the traditional duty of neutrality. 66 Absent authoritative
community determineation of aggression in the Yom Kippur War,
each state was free to determine whether it would characterize
which side was lawfully using armed force, and whether the state
would choose to descriminate on the basis of its characterization, or
~icDougal and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 446-47, recited some departures from
the rule in World War II, as does Norton in recent practice, supra note 37, at
294-97, but neither suggests that the rule has ceased to be operative.

62

Rousseau, Chrouiques des .faits inferuatiouaux, 70 Revue generale de Droit in·
ternational public 129, 180 (1960), cited in Norton, supra note 40, at 294 n. 200.

63

Schindler, Aspects conlempraius de la neutralite, 121 Hague Recueil des Cout·s
221, 291 (1967).

64

Norton, supra note 40, at 295, reports such acts by Portugal, Italy, and Ger·
many, citing articles in the New York Times.

65
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continue impartially to deny military transit either by belligerents
or states assisting the belligerents.
The present trend of decision regarding belligerent tranist in territorial waters is uncertain. The trend is that during conflict a neutral is not obligated to allow passage of warships under claim of
right of innocent passage. 67 The neutral has competence to regulate
or even prevent such passage, except in the case of straits or canals
connecting high seas 68 ("international" straits or canals). The question is, what passage may a neutral permit? Article 10 of Hague
Convention XIII provides that "mere passage" of a warship or prize
can be authorized by a neutral, while Article 5 states that the belligerent cannot use neutral ports and waters as a "base of operations."69
It would appear that the neutral could permit passage that does
not substantially prejudice the relative military positions of the belligerents. This would accord with the principle of military effectiveness, while recognizing the policy of minimal destruction by allowing the neutral to avoid danger of combat within its territorial waters. We must remember that the neutral was not under a duty to
permit even "mere passage" of a war ship through its territorial
waters. Article 10 of Hague Convention XIII provided that the neutral could authorize such passage at its option. 70 Since whether a
particular passage might or might not reasonably be viewed as
prejudicing the position of the opposing belligerents, depending
upon the specific situation at hand, a neutral state might prefer to
refuse passage in any or all cases, for increased protection from the
risks of incidental damage in the course of belligerent combat, or of
sanctions taken by a complainant belligerent.

The World War II case of the Altmark, 71 a German naval auxiliary vessel passing through Nonvegian waters carrying British
67

l\1cDougal and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 452 and authorities cited therein.

Baxter, Passage of Ships Through Intenwtional Watencays in Time o.f War,
XXXI Brit. Y.B. Int'l. L. 187 (1954).

68
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Arts. 5 and 10, Hague Convention (XIII), supra note 54.

70

/d. at art. 10.
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Facts are set forth in VII Hackworth, supra note 2, at 568-69.
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prisoners of war enroute to Germany, and accompanied by Norwegian military craft, points out the real possibility of dispute. British
war vessels halted the Altmark and took off the British prisoners.
In answer to Norwegian protests, the British response was that
only a "normal cruise" through neutral territorial waters was permissible, i.e., that passage through the neutral waters had to be the
reasonable route between two points, normally the most direct
route, and that the Altmark had departed substantially from a reasonable route in order to use the Norwegian waters as sanctuary to
avoid British attack.
In the future, in view of the high speed and enormous fire power
of modern surface and subsurface naval craft, and the increased
breadth of territorial waters, belligerent state attitudes will equate
belligerent maritime transit with land transit as being forbidden.
Also, neutral states probably will concur, due to increased risk of
substantial incidental damage and of other involvement that may
result if combat occurs in their territorial waters when the opposing
belligerent disapproves of the neutral's permission for maritime
transit and has little or no time otherwise to prevent the transit.
An exception to the duty of preventing belligerent transit has allowed transit for humanitarian purposes, to allow passage of the
wounded and sick. 72 This benefits the belligerent to some extent,
but the policy of minimal destruction of values-here, human
life-predominates.
Discussion of belligerent use of neutral territory for base areas
will be followed by consideration of the nature of the duty of the
neutral to prevent belligerent transit or use of base areas, and the
rights of the opposing belligerent if the neutral does not prevent
these acts.
b. Belligerent use of neutral territory for base areas and other
activities promoting military objectives.

Under traditional neutrality law, a neutral was obligated to prevent use of its territory by a belligerent to establish base areas
either for logistic support of operations conducted elsewhere, or for
positions from which to launch attacks. As to other activities, the
72
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trend of past decision was to identify certain acts as prohibited,
rather than to take a broad functional approach by prohibiting any
belligerent activity in neutral territory that "augments its power to
bring harm to the enemy." 73 Four aspects of this obligation have
been selected for comment in the following discussion.
i. Recruiting e.[forts within neutral ten·ito1·y to obtain militm·u
manpower.

Although the customary rule was that a neutral was not obligated
to prevent its citizens from joining a belligerent's forces, the neutral
was required to prevent the conduct of belligerent recruiting operations on neutral territory. 74 In modern armed conflicts which generally involve substantial numbers of military personnel, this concern
may not be as pertinent. However, in the case of conflicts between
states having a scarcity of personnel trained in modern military
technology, a belligerent's recruitment of military or other skilled
personnel in neutral territory may continue to be of substantial concern to opposing belligerents. The points made in our earlier discussion concerning the duty of the neutral state not to assist in providing military personnel or material would apply here to favor continuing the prohibition against belligerent recruiting operations in
neutral territory.
ii. Constructing and arming militm·y l'essels, ai1·cra.t1 m· other
equipment for use by the bellige1·ent in militm·y operations.

This is a classical area of prohibition, whether the work is carried
out directly by the belligerent or by neutral state citizens acting as
the belligerent's agents. 75 However, the prohibition was avoided by
the technicality of direct purchase from private sources instead of
commissioning war equipment construction. 76 It has been noted
above that neutral states may now be obligated to prevent such direct private sales. The two present avoidance devices are (a)
stockpiling of replacement parts purchased from a neutral or its
73

3 Hyde, supra note 43, at 2249.
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/d. at 2238-40; Art. 4, Hague Convention (V), supra notl' til.
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Art. 8, Hague Convention (XIII), supra note 54; !'lie Dougal and Feliciano,
supra note 1, at 463.
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0ppenheim, supra note 2, at 714.
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citizens before the conflict, and (b) establishing commitments under
long-term contracts. As to the first device, it appears permissible;
as to the second, it is arguable that no reasonable distinction exists
between sales effected after conflict occurs and continued performance under prior long-term contracts. The same policies, discussed
earlier, that support prohibition of sales also support suspension of
performance under these contracts once conflict begins.
c. Use of neutral territory for communication pnrposes.

The traditional rule provided that the belligerent could not establish land radio stations to transmit military information, and could
not use ship radios in neutral waters except for distress signals. 77
However, other means of communication existing at that time were
not dealt with, such as the telegraph, land telephone, and submarine cables; and use of neutral government or privately owned radio
systems was permissible. 78
During the two World Wars the trend of decision in practice was
to regard neutral states as under a duty to exercise reasonable efforts to regulate all communication systems in their territory to
prevent belligerent communication of military information. 79 This
modern trend recognizes the vital role of communication systems in
conveying intelligence information, and in coordinating far-flung
military forces.
d. Use of neutral ports by belligerent war vessels.

The traditional rule was that the neutral was under no duty either
to prevent entry and stay of belligerent war vessels, or to permit it,
except for distress. Therefore, the neutral could establish conditions
for entry, and the time allowed for repairs, refueling and resupply. 80 This approach obviously provided opportunity for neutral assistance to the belligerents, albeit offered impartially to both sides.
77 Art. 3, Hague Convention (V), supra note 61; Art. 5, Hague Convention (XII!),
supra note 70; Art. 4(b), Havana Convention, supra note 54.
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Tucker, supra note 2, at 240.
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This departure from the general principle of nonassistance to
either side by the neutral (e.g., no provision of military forces or
military materials, and no permission for belligerent transit or base
areas) is seemingly congruent with the concept of impartiality, since
access to ports, and repairs, fuel, and supplies were offered equally
to each belligerent. However, the rule is subject to challenge as
contrary to community policies. First, in actual operation, a belligerent may be able to control the seas, so that in fact only that belligerent could avail itself of the opportunity of using neutral ports,
to the detriment of the military position of the opposing belligerent.
Second, in the day of long-range strike capability against naval
forces through use of aircraft, submarines and missiles, one should
not expect that the opposing belligerent will be inclined to accept
this detrimental use of neutral facilities any more than belligerent
transit or base areas in neutral territory.
Thus, the risk exists that a neutral will become involved in combat activities, with increased ambit for destruction, if the traditional rule is applied in future conflicts. In modern warfare there is
less need of neutral ports, since modern naval vessels are capable of
longer cruises at higher speeds and have resupply ships. The importance to belligerents of open neutral ports may be reduced, but not
to the point that access to neutral ports is seen as de mininms. The
result may be to encourage termination of the rule of open neutral
ports. A general rule of admission only for distress and then, internment, would appear more in keeping with those community
policies, as discussed earlier.
e. Nature of the duty of the neut1·al to prel,ent unlawful belligerent use of neutral's territory.

The duty of a neutral state to prevent belligerent transit or use of
base areas, and related activities, requires it to exercise reasonable
effort, including use of force, to prevent improper acts by a belligerent, unless, perhaps, the belligerent's power is manifestly so
overwhelming as to demonstrate futility of effort. 81 The neutral
may fail to use reasonable preventive effort, or may be excused
from its duty, after either reasonable but unsuccessful effort, or a
showing of manifest futility of making the effort.
81 0ppenheim, supra note 2, at 690; Hyde, supra note 43, at 2336-44; Castren,
supra note 2, at 440-42; Greenspan, supra note 2, at 534.
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Regardless of the reasons, the neutral's failure to perform its
duty authorizes the opposing belligerent to take proportionate preventive action against the unlawful belligerent activity, including
action within neutral territory. 82 Where the neutral is excused from
its duty to prevent the belligerent transit, conduct of the opposing
belligerent may be viewed merely as the excercise of sanction
against the belligerent engaging in activity in violation of the laws
of neutrality. Further, if the belligerent engaging in the improper
activity was the aggressor in the conflict situation, the opposing
belligerent's now permissible use of force in neutral territory also
would be lawful use of force in continuing self-defense 83 (or pursuant to organized community authorization).
If the neutral in fact invites or grants permission for preventive
action by the opposing belligerent, the latter's action could also be
viewed as in collective defense of the neutral's rights to protection
against forcible intrusion into its territory by a belligerent. Where
the neutral negligently fails to use reasonable efforts to prevent the
unlawful belligerent transit activity in neutral territory, or indeed,
intentionally permits it, preventive action of the opposing belligerent may not only be used against the belligerent activity, but also in
reprisal against the neutral to cause it to adhere to its duty under
the laws of neutrality.
One should note again the caveat discussed earlier in this paper,
that if the neutral is supporting a belligerent engaged in collective
or self-defense or other action pursuant to organized community authorization, such partiality would be permissible and counteraction
impermissible. This is so because the law as to impermissible use of
force now authorizes discriminatory departure from the laws of neutrality. The neutral then would be asserting a neutral's right of affirmative discrimination to oppose aggression under the modern law
of neutrality, while the aggressor state would be disenabled from
asserting a breach of neutrality.
A recent example of belligerent transit and use of base areas
raising various issues was the use of Cambodian territory by mili82

0ppenheim, supra note 2, at 695 n.l; Greenspan, supra note 2, at 538; Castren,
note 2, at 462-63.
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tary forces of the People's Republic of Vietnam. 84 That belligerent
used the "Ho Chi Minh Trail" for years for military transit and established major base areas in Cambodia, although Cambodia had declared its neutrality in the Vietnam conflict by its domestic legislation and in formal pronouncements in the international arena. 8 ti One
readily may grant that the Cambodian Government opposed these
belligerent activities in its territory, but that any Cambodian effort
to prevent them would have been futile and might have resulted in
substantial destruction in Cambodia. In any event, the case is clear
under international law that the opposing belligerents could in support of the laws of neutrality take proportionate action in Cambodia
against the improper belligerent activities, including aerial bombing
(which occurred for some years) and temporary, appropriately limited, military occupation of neutral territory (the well-lrnown "Cambodian incursion" of 1970). 8 6

3. Belligerent claims to embargo economic intercom·se with the
enemy.
The next category of claims we consider concerns belligerent embargo of enemy economic intercourse with neutrals. The traditional
law of neutrality sought to preserve to the greatest extent possible
economic intercourse between neutrals and belligerents. However,
in this century two world wars have involved all-out economic warfare, with the objective of virtually halting the flow of goods from
and to the opposing belligerents, and consequently, terminating
their commerce with neutrals. The present trend is that a belligerent state lawfully may embargo commercial relationships of the
neutral and the enemy. 87
See Stevenson, United States .\filitary Action in Cambociia: Questions uf In·
ternational Law, 62 Dept. of State Bull. 765 (1970); Moore, Legal Dime11sious of
the Decision to Intercede in Cambodia, 65 Am. J. lnt'l. L. 1 (1971); Norton, supra
note 40, at 283-90.
84

85 Announcement of the Royal Cambodian Government, May 23, 1965, and Communique of the Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 12, 1965, in [1965)
Annuaire francais du Droit international 1077, 1082; Norton, supra note 40, at
269.
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See authorities cited supra note 84.

87 0ppenheim, supra note 2, at 796-97; Stone, supra note 2, at 508-10; McDougal
and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 478-79.
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The only issue is the reasonableness of measures used in the context of the particular conflict. The principle of minimal destruction
calls for that appraisal. Questions of what goods to control, labeled
"contraband," and the methods of stopping the flow of those goods,
should be answered upon a contextual analysis: reasonableness
under the circumstances. No a priori rules will provide the answers. Here, as elsewhere, if organized community authority is
exercised, it is paramount.
Article 41 of the United Nations Charter provides that the Security Council may decide upon "complete or partial interruption of
economic relations." In the absence of organized community decision, the rule of proportionality must provide the guide in the process of neutral-belligerent claim and counterclaim. We briefly consider the subjects of contraband and the means of halting the flow of
or embargoing the enemy's economic intercourse.

a. Contraband. The traditional approach was to divide goods into
three categories: absolute contraband (items specialized as to use in
war); conditional contraband (items susceptible of use in war, but
which might be used for other purposes, e.g., vehicles, engines,
machinery); and free articles (not capable of use in war). 88 Under
the traditional rules, absolute contraband destined for enemycontrolled territory could be seized; free articles could not. Conditional contraband destined for enemy-controlled territory could be
seized only if consigned to the enemy government or to its military
bases. 89 Paranthetically, all enemy exports could be seized; it was
only neutral exports to the belligerents that enjoyed any freedom of
movement.
The modern trend of decision has been first, that the category of
conditional contraband has increased enormously due to the development of military technology, and to the trend toward comprehensive national mobilization of resources for war effort. As regards the latter aspect, expansion of conditional contraband reflects
community acknowledgement that governments in modern armed
conflicts exercise comprehensive control over the public and private
London Declaration Concerning the Laws of Naval Warfare, Feb. 26, 1909, in 2
A Collection of Neutrality Laws, Regulations and Treaties of Various Countries
1380 (Deak and Jessup eds., 1939).

88

89 I d.,
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sectors of the economy, and allocate all resources, including food
stuffs and other basic resources, in the manner best suited to support the war effort. Consequently, for both reasons stated above,
the category of goods designated a priori as free articles has shrunk
drastically. Whereas, under the 1900 Declaration of London, raw
materials, foodstuffs and clothing were free articles, by World War
II all were classified as conditional contraband, leaving little more
than inconsequential luxury items as free articles. 90
Ironically, any item that might now still be designated as a free
article probably would be one that the opposing belligerent will not
permit to be imported in any event, to conserve scarce foreign exchange! Further, the general trend during World War II and afterward has been for the belligerent to seize all conditional contraband, recognizing that the existence of comprehensive governmental regulation of all economic resources of the state means
that, at least potentially, all conditional contraband may be devoted
to the war effort. 91 In actual operation, then, almost all goods of
significance in sustaining the opposing belligerent's economy may be
treated the same as formally designated absolute contraband.

b. Methods of stopping the flow of goods from and to the enemy.

One of the traditional methods of stopping the flow of contraband
to the enemy, or the flow of enemy exports, was by visit and search
to identify contraband and enemy identity of exports or vessels. 92
In modern conflicts, visit and search may be highly dangerous, with
stationary vessels an easy target for aircraft, submarines, surface
craft, and land-based missiles. Further, with enemy property or
property destined for enemy-controlled territory masked by complex corporate and fiscal arrangements and by flags of convenience,
determination of enemy identity or of contraband, now and in the
future, may require lengthy investigation impossible to conduct
during a visit and search on the high seas. Past difficulties in this
90
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regard have already resulted in a trend toward diversion of vessel
and cargo to a port for investigation. 93 The outcome is much more
extensive interruption of all neutral trade, for the purpose of determining whether seizable property is being carried.
The second traditional method of embargoing enemy trade was
the blockade. Traditionally, the requirement for an "effective"
blockade94-a sufficiency of vessels committed to the blockade to
demonstrate reasonable ability to stop the flow of enemy exports
and halt contraband-rather than a symbolic "paper" blockade, had
the effect of limiting the number and geographic extent of blockades.
In the nineteenth century, an effective blockade required a substantial number of scarce war vessels, which were needed for combat
operations as well. The result was to restrict blockades to "close-in"
blockades of the most important enemy ports or other coastal areas.
Modern military technology has revolutionized blockade strategy
in modern armed conflicts. On the one hand, the development of
aircraft and missiles have made close-in blockades extremely
dangerous; on the other hand, radar, long range aircraft and swift
surface craft have reduced the need for a great number of ships to
blockage a port. Further, military technology has provided mines
and submarines, which can achieve effective "long distance" blockades of great areas at much less risk to the blockader. 95 However,
the risk of indiscriminate destruction to neutral as well as opposing
belligerent craft is much greater, even if the blockade provides assistance in guiding vessels through safe sea lanes, and so forth. Again,
the result is not only more comprehensive embargo of all trade with
the opposing belligerent, but substantial restriction of all neutral commerce in the general theater of the conflict.
The trend has been to recognize the legality of interdicting efforts
virtually throughout the oceans, rather than merely close-in at
enemy ports. 96 In fact, operationally, the most effective way to
93 McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 489.
94 Arts. 2-3, London Declaration, supra note 88; Harvard Research, R(qltls aud
Duties of Neutral Powers iu Nat•al aud Aerial War, 33 Am. J. Int'l. L. Supp. 711
(1939).
95Qppenheim, supm note 2, at 791-92; Stone, supra note 2, at 508-10.
96 McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 492-97.
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achieve regulation and minimize interference with acceptable neutral shipping has been for the belligerent side exercising predominant naval power to have its officials in neutral ports provide certifications that the neutral ship is not carrying contraband
("navicerts") or enemy exports ("certificates of origin and interest"). 97
In the future, if the particular belligerents have the military
capacity, we may expect continued use of indiscriminate area
methods of blockade. As to the problem of control of carriage of
goods by aircraft and submarine, future belligerents may seek to
prohibit entirely such neutral traffic by aircraft, because of the impossibility of "visit and search," unless allowed to examine the aircraft at its point of departure. As to neutral traffic by submarines,
adequate control would require surfacing and diversion to ports for
inspection. In view of the great strike capability of the modern
submarine, and its speed and evasive ability, the probabilities are
that substantial sea areas off the coast of enemy-controlled territory
and other critical areas would be closed to neutral submarines, or
else entry in those areas would be permitted only if the submarine
proceeds on the surface.
The outcomes of the trend of decision are that, depending upon
the particular conflict, a belligerent may lawfully halt virtually all
neutral commerce with the opposing belligerent, and that the
methods used to embargo economic intercourse with the enemy automatically also restrict greatly all neutral trade in the geographic
proximity of the opposing belligerent.
A modest suggestion, in keeping with the policy of balance of the
objectives of military effectiveness and of minimal destruction of
values, is that the principle of proportionality in using coercion
should operate here, as elsewhere in the laws of war and neutrality.
What is permissible in all future instances of conflict should not be
judged by the situation of World Wars I and II. In situations where
the permissible objectives for the use of force are substantially
more limited, it should follow that the category of goods properly
designated as contraband would be more limited, and that the
necessary methods of interdicting neutral commercial intercourse
97

1 Medlicott, The Ecouowic Blockadr 94-101, 343-50, 436-42 (1952); 2 u/. chs. 5
and 15 (1959).
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with the opposing belligerent would be more limited. This would be
matter for analysis in the context of the particular conflict situation,
which can change through time. It must be recognized that the past
trend of decision provides much room for broad discretion by belligerents.
4. Claims concerning belligerent conduct of hostile operations in
neutral territory.

A state chooses to be neutral in order to avoid the destructive
outcomes of armed conflict. So long as the neutral state adheres to
its duties as a neutral, belligerent conduct of hostile operations in
the neutral's territory would be unlawful. As noted above, if the
neutral fails to prevent unlawful belligerent use of its territory, the
opposing belligerent permissibly can conduct proportionate combat
operations in the neutral's territory to terminate that unlawful belligerent activity. Beyond this exception, the problem of protection
of neutral territory from destructive impact in future armed conflicts is posed by modern military technology. 98 Except for isolated
minor instances of accidental misdirection of military firepower,
neutral states in the past reasonably could expect to avoid destruction from the conflict. Their interest was in avoidance.
In future conflicts, one must acknowledge that if nuclear or bacteriological weapons are used, their destructive consequences may
well be felt over wide regions, perhaps globally. Neutral states may
suffer equally with belligerents. Missiles, nuclear and conventional,
may go astray in neutral territory, and will be combatted by antimissile systems at the opportune moment regardless of whether
that happens to be when the missile is above neutral or belligerent
territory. Modern aerial and long range artillery bombardment in
border areas, or modern naval conflict near neutral coasts, necessarily will damage neutral territory accidently. This was the case
even during World War II, for example, when allied bombers accidently dropped bombs on the territory of Switzerland. 99
Even if the belligerents causing this "incidental" damage to neutral states provide compensation, neutral states may have less exas see discussion in McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 1, at 388-90, 472-73.
99

Royal Institute of International Affairs, supra note 44, at 224-35.
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pectation of avoidance of destructive effects in future armed conflicts. Further, depending upon the intensity of damage that is suffered by neutrals and upon the capability of belligerents causing the
damage to provide compensation, there may develop a trend that
the belligerent is not liable for damage that resulted unavoidably in
the course of lawful, nonnegligent combat operations against the
opposing belligerent, or that the belligerent causing damage in that
situation is liable only to contribute compensation according to its
capability.

V. CONCLUSION
In this impressionistic, highly selective survey of the developing
law of neurality in modern armed conflicts, the author has emphasized, first, that accurate, useful analysis and appraisal of legal
developments require a methodology entailing: (a) comprehensive
and contextual factual analysis of the particular process of armed
conflict and of the relations of the particular belligerents and neutrals; (b) a careful analysis of the trends of legal decision on claims
concerning neutrality and of the changes in conditions upon which
those trends are based; and (c) appraisal of those trends in light of
advocated world community policies.
Second, our brief survey of selected trends of decision has emphasized: (a) that the laws of neutrality are indeed pertinent to
community policies concerning the maintenance of international
peace and security and the limitation of the destructive outcomes of
armed conflict; (b) that although the development of rules limiting
the use of armed force in international relations and the establishment of the United Nations Charter system have had major impact
upon the traditional laws of neutrality, substantial scope exists for
the developing law of neutrality to continue to operate; and (c) that
modern warfare and the present world power process already have
resulted in customary practice repudiating or modifying many of the
traditional rules of neutrality law.
The challenge for future legal research is both to determine defmitively the present trends in the laws of neutrality, and to propose to world community decision-makers recommendations for
change that will assure that the modern law of neutrality promotes
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the maximum achievement of the twin goals of public order and
mninimal destruction from armed violence. In devoting effort to this
task, legal scholars will, indeed, be serving "the interests of humanity and the ever progressive needs of civilization."1°0

100 Preamble, Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, with Annex of Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277; T.S. No. 639; .Mar·
tens, 3 Nouveau recueil general de traites 461.
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